



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


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
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SPEECH

1760

OF

HON. JOSEPH R. CHANDLER,

OF PENNSYLVANIA,

ON THE

COLLINS LINE OF AMERICAN STEAMERS.

DELIVERED

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

JULY 6, 1852.

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"Superiority may be conceded for a time, in what it takes time to complete, but no nation will wisely and willingly admit that she is to remain inferior. No matter on what the stake is set for national contest, it is of national import that victory should be achieved."

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WASHINGTON:  
PRINTED BY JNO. T. TOWERS.  
1852.



## S P E E C H .

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The House having under consideration the bill to supply deficiencies in the appropriations for the fiscal year ending the 30th June, 1852—Mr. CHANDLER said:

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I need not tell this House that I am specially opposed to the patronage which this Government has weakly, and as some think wickedly bestowed upon the city of New York, in disregard, and I may say, to the injury of other cities of the Union. I last year dwelt with earnestness, and, as it proved, with effect, upon the manifest wrong which the lavish partiality of the Government to New York had inflicted upon other cities—among others, that which I in part represent on the floor of this House; and in no one particular has that injudicious preference been manifested more than in that of patronage continued to certain steamboat lines running from and to New York, in opposition to other lines owned there or elsewhere in the Union, and running in the same trade, and between the same ports. *Running*, I have said, with these Government-favored steamers—not exactly so, Mr. Chairman—but *ready* to run with them, whenever private enterprises can be left free to compete with private exertions.

Against these things, Mr. Chairman, I have protested not only because New York was thereby enabled to maintain her swelling port, without the investment of ample capital, and without the effort of fair competition; but also, and especially have I protested, and do I protest against it, because, inflated with the favor,



New York claims all else of national patronage and national distinction, and makes the success of her constant demands the grounds for augmented favoritism ; thus improving upon the axiom of Scripture, and taking the coat of the Government because it has already possessed itself of the cloak.

There is a point when governmental favor, like parental partiality, rises from an error into a crime, because, while it inflates into impracticable insolence the object of its favor, it disheartens, cripples, and destroys the neglected rival. The judicious parent will promote his own interest, indulge his own affection, and secure the success of his family, not by lavishing his means upon one child to the injury of another, but by the judicious distribution of his property among all his sons, to enable them to compete with the enterprise of antagonistic or rival neighbors.

So, Mr. Chairman, a judicious Government will seek to diffuse its favor, if it have favor to bestow, upon all portions of its citizens, to enable each to give efficacy to its industry, and to enable all to contend against the industry and enterprise of the people or Government of another country. And while I advocate the former, and desire also the latter—while I protest in the name of my constituents against any uses of public funds that shall tend to promote centralization on any one city against all others in the Union, beyond the advantages of nature, and the results of well-directed enterprise, I advocate such a system of governmental power and legislative competency as shall enable the citizens of this country, in all enterprises that involve capital and industry, and seek to enlarge national and individual benefit, to compete with and outstrip the enterprise and industry of foreign shores ; and if that enterprise and industry, and that devotion of capital by foreigners,

have one of their *points d'appui* upon our shores—if England, that almost omnipotent architect of commercial consequence, centers one foot of her mighty compasses in London, and turns the other on New York, or any other city of our Union—then, sir, I say it is not for Philadelphia, it is not for Boston, not for Baltimore, not for New Orleans, to stand aside, and let our means, our commerce, our trade, our habits of business, be circumscribed by English rule, and made subservient to British profits.

The amendment now under consideration is a proposition to give to a line of steamers now already patronized, an additional amount of compensation for carrying the mail across the Atlantic.

Various objections are made to this amendment :

1st. That individuals of New York must be more concerned than the public, because they are so anxious and clamorous for the means of relief.

2d. It is said that it is only a New York enterprise, and therefore, has no claim for support upon the nation at large.

3d. It is added that no benefit can come from dividing with Great Britain the business of mail transportation.

4th. And that the contest with England as to whose steamer shall run the fastest in the race across the ocean, is unworthy national engagement.

I purpose occupying a few minutes of the time of this committee in considering these objections, and if it should appear that the premises which I have assumed are correct, and that the Government should sustain her people against the enterprises of foreigners, supported by their own Government; and if I am successful in showing you that the enterprise denominated

the "Collins Line of Steamers" is not a local work; that it is of general consequence, and is opposed by foreign capital, sustained by foreign governmental patronage, then I shall ask your concurrence in the proposition to adopt the amendment which the Senate has made to the Deficiency bill, with regard to this line of steamers.

And let me add, that while I ask for the protection of home industry, home enterprise, home capital, and home independence, I only ask it as a temporary encouragement. I do not expect that Government is continually to protect the same industry and the same investment, or, indeed, any industry and any investment which shall not in time acquire strength, gristle, and bone to sustain itself. I am regarding the "Collins line of steamers" as I regard any other American effort—any other child of our glorious institution. The child must be sustained until it can go alone, and when it has once had its share of public support it must stand and move upon its own feet, and leave public support and public protection to some younger project.

Mr. STEVENS, of Pennsylvania. I desire to ask my colleague why it is that the Government is asked to give a specific sum to certain individuals to carry the mails across the ocean, instead of giving the service to the lowest bidder, as is done every where else? I admire the magnanimity of my colleague in going for New York, and I hope the gentlemen from New York will go for our mint; but I do not understand his argument. (Laughter.)

Mr. CHANDLER. If the gentleman will sit and listen with his usual attention, and exercise his usual judgment, he will hear how I answer that question. It is very pertinent, and one which naturally suggests itself.

Mr. Chairman, the measure now before the committee, is one that is more strongly recommended by the New Yorkers than by any other class of citizens. It proposes assistance to an enterprise which purports to be of New York origin, and New York investment.

The steamers connected therewith were built at New York, are registered at New York, they arrive at, and depart from, New York in fulfillment of their transatlantic mission, and they bear upon their ample sterns the name of the commercial emporium of the State of New York.

The incessant clamor of the New York gentlemen around the bar of this House, and around the bars of many other houses of this city, must not, however, be cited in proof that the "Collins line of steamers" is of New York concern alone. Nor can the fact that these ocean palaces were built and registered in that city, and that they depart from and arrive at New York, be admitted as any proof that the enterprise which has given them existence and sustained them thus far, even with considerable pecuniary loss, is of less than national importance—less indeed than national direct interest.

These vessels must be built somewhere, and they must be registered somewhere, and they must, by the law of the land, have upon them in legible characters, their own name and the name of the place at least in which they are registered, and they must, to compete with the British undertaking, have with some of the British steamers running between England and the United States, a common port.

New York, then, was preferred. It is, for such an enterprise, as well chosen as almost any other would be—and that the New York people are clamorous, does not prove that they alone are interested, but only that in the habit of constant appeal for themselves, they but

indulge that habit when they make prominent their own interests in an enterprise which, by investment, character, and results, must be regarded as *national*, and therefore asking the House to sustain the amendment of the Senate, upon grounds entirely distinct from the claims to patronage in individual efforts against another or rival enterprise of one city more than another.

The truth is, sir, that these steamers are national not more by their conditional dedication to the public service, than by their universality of their ownership. They are not owned alone in New York. Philadelphia capital is largely invested therein, and if you have heard less of that than of New York interest, it is simply because Philadelphia is always less clamorous than New York for justice to her interest.

There are a few points in the remarks of the honorable gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. BRECKINRIDGE) which struck me forcibly—as, indeed, what does that gentleman say upon this floor that does not deserve and receive attention. The honorable gentleman, in his speech, referred to the contest between the Cunard and Collins lines as an antagonism between man and man, and he spoke of such rivalry as “the rude contest of commerce.” The honorable gentleman mistakes the matter entirely. There is no contest between man and man. If there were, or if between company and company, I should say, “stand aside, fair play, and no favor.” I will never ask odds for an American against any other man, nor ask odds for an American company against a British company. But when an Englishman comes into our very ports, and, under the noses of our merchants, sits down and plans his voyage to take our commerce, and throws into our faces the Treasury of the British Crown, I say we have but one alternative—

either to relinquish all contest, or to make that contest equal by backing the American ship against the British-backed concern. The affair, sir, is not the rude contest of commerce—it is the artful enterprise of a nation, that, having eaten the life out of India, Ireland, and Portugal, comes now with vampire appetite to fasten upon our limbs and glut itself upon the life-blood of our commerce.

The appeal of the honorable gentleman to the Democrats of this House, against the provisions of the amendment under consideration, was most painful to my ears. Has party discipline been made so efficient that it may be invoked against the experiment which we are trying of ocean steam navigation? And is it to be a part of the principles of the progressive party that it is to check the growing enterprise of our country? Is Democracy destructive? I know a portion of it is; but is the Democracy in which that gentlemen shares, of the iconoclastic kind that destroys the images of all that is great in commercial enterprise, and all that is brilliant in mercantile possession? When honorable gentlemen are thinking about withdrawing the public patronage from the trans-atlantic steamers, let them pause and think what are the destinies of that network of steamers with which Great Britain overlays the great oceans. Does he not see that at this moment that far-reaching and over-reaching Power is appointing steamers to reach her Eastern possessions by the way of the Isthmus of Darien, and that she feels that, with the decay of her commerce in the Indies is the weakening of her grasp on the trident of the ocean? Does the honorable gentleman forget the great political truth, that the Power which commands the commerce of the East, commands the ocean, is the mistress of the sea, and therefore, the arbitrator if not the ruler of the

world? England sees this, and, awakening to the truth at the time when her own domination seemed to wane, she seizes upon ocean steam, and quickens individual enterprise by national patronage till she can reassert her supremacy and reconstitute herself as the law-giver of trade; and the honorable gentleman appeals to the Democracy of the country to allow Great Britain to reassume her dominant position. Nay, sir, he turned to the Whigs with an imploring, half-hoping appeal. I, sir, turn to no party, no section; I lay the case before this committee as before American Representatives, representing Americans, and I shall prosecute my argument upon the broad ground of national good; and if any member of this committee points me to a plank in any platform whatsoever, I point him, sir, to the ark of our national covenant, and tell him to leave those perishable materials, and their petty, temporary offices, and to stand by the country, its Constitution, and its means of true independence.

Reference is made to the terms offered by other companies to carry the mails between New York and other ports of this country. Of that I have very little to say. If the United States has made a contract with steamboat proprietors to carry the mail, where there exists only individual competition, as with the California lines, that contract must be fulfilled in letter and in spirit; not one jot or tittle must fail on the part of the Government; the faith and honor of a republic must be kept as sacred and as immaculate as those of a monarch. And we must even make some allowances for short-comings in the contractors. Though in all their home contracts, let it be remembered, Mr. Chairman, the Government patronage is interposed between rival American concerns; or if, when first exercised, only one claimant is presented, it is certain that now

rival cities, as well as rival merchants, ask to share the favor, or failing in that, ask that their enterprise may not be weakened by the partiality of the National Government to a favored company or a favored city.

But even in these rival claims, Mr. Chairman, you find the benefit of primary protection; the road is open, the enterprise is found practicable, and the Government, a kind mother, has nursed, and encouraged, and established a trade which now invites and rewards competition; and so soon as the expiration or violation of contract will warrant the step, let the field of domestic enterprise be thrown open to domestic competition. But, sir, what is done in, and for these lines, is not for us now to define or to defend. It is with COLLINS'S LINE alone that we are concerned; and I repeat it, sir, it is with that line as opposed to and opposed by the Cunard line, sustained by British governmental patronage, in our own waters, and waging a warfare upon American enterprise, even in the markets of the continent of Europe, underbidding for freight, when Collins's ships are there, and underrating the American means when they are absent.

This is all true, Mr. Chairman, but it is not all the truth. When the American steamer is to depart on the same day with the British, the sea-coast of the continent is secured with steam tugs to bring freight to the British boats. From Havre to Liverpool; from Antwerp, Bremer-Haven, Hamburg, and other ports along and down the coast, bringing it, sir, free of freight when the American steamer is to depart, but making a high charge for those freights when the United States interpose no competition. It is thus that the British Government provides for the commerce of that country; it is thus that she fosters and protects her trade; it is thus that she has placed herself in the position she



now occupies; and it is thus that she will maintain and elevate that position against the United States, if we neglect the means presented to place ourselves in the commanding position which all circumstances, but our want of liberality present.

In the first six years under Cunard the Government of Great Britain received for postage alone seven millions eight hundred and thirty-six thousand eight hundred dollars, (\$7,836,800,) and they paid in that time to Cunard \$2,550,000; thus realizing a net revenue to the Government of \$5,286,000.

Now the Cunard steamers crossed the Atlantic eighty-four times, and Collins's only forty; of course, the British steamers carried double the number of mails, and received a much greater excess of postage. And, I may add, that the British Government, in the Post Office Department, took pains to secure to the Cunard steamers all the advantages possible, refusing to send any letters by the Collins steamers unless the letter should be specially marked for one of these steamers by name, even though the Cunard steamer was to leave Liverpool first. The difference between the number of trips of the two lines will not be so great if this amendment should pass. In that event, which I confidently predict, the Cunard line will draw off *three* of their steamers, and thus divide the labor and the profits.

I did not design, sir, to refer to that part of the understanding between the contracting parties, which regards these steamers as resorts of our Navy Department in case of war, but the honorable gentleman from Kentucky has chosen to refer thereto, and to express a doubt whether they are suited for that purpose, and to deny that any sum less than \$100,000 will render them fit. Sir, the steamers of the Collins line are bet-

ter, stronger, more nearly approaching the war standard than the contract required, and when they passed from the builder's hands, they were pronounced by the proper officers fit for war service, of course, with such additions and alterations in various ways as about \$20,000 would supply. The argument of the gentleman from Kentucky is against the sufficiency of these steamers as war vessels. As batteries, sir, they may not be equal to some others, but there are many uses for steamers in war, to which these vessels may be applied; for which they are adapted beyond all others. Capacity to carry troops, and speed to overtake an enemy, or to escape from superior force. I need not argue this, sir; it is evident, that in any war in which our country may be engaged, she will have need of just such vessels as these; and very recently Great Britain has made use of her right to some of the ocean mercantile steamers of the character of those of the Collins line, to convey her troops and otherwise to assist in an expedition against Rangoon. The slow, lumbering process of other times will not now avail. Celebrity is as important as numbers; indeed, it supplies the place of numbers, and the power that can present and remove its forces the soonest, has the victory, and hereafter our own harbors and sea-ports must, in time of war, look to railroads to convey troops for their defence, and to steamships and locomotive batteries to defend the point assailed.

One other view must be taken of this question of war steamers. If the time should ever arrive (and we see that it has arrived in Great Britain) when any of these steamers should be needed for war purposes by our Government, it will be for that Government then to decide how much cheaper they will be supplied to her than could be those which she could build. Un-

Fortunately, it is with Government war vessels as it is with horses—the cost of keeping them a short time far exceeds the cost of purchase. And while these Collins steamers may be placed in active service in a few days, and at an expense of \$20,000 a piece, it would cost ten times \$20,000 for the Government to keep them six months waiting for the demands of war. I repeat it, sir, if the Collins steamers were in the service for the Government, (now awaiting war vessels,) they would cost \$2,000,000 a year; and if in the navy yard, they would cost \$500,000 a year.

And now, sir, in support of my assertion, allow me to present a copy of a statement from Francis Grice, one of the most accomplished naval constructors of the country:

“UNITED STATES NAVY YARD,

“PHILADELPHIA, *April 14, 1852.*

“SIR: In answer to yours of the 13th, I have to state, as chief naval constructor, the specifications for building the Collins line of steamers were submitted to me, and approved, as in accordance with the act of 3d of March, 1847.

“They can be converted into war steamers to carry a battery equal to our largest steam frigates, in a short time, and the necessary alterations to be made to receive such a battery will not exceed a cost of \$20,000 each.

“I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

“FRANCIS GRICE.

“To the Hon. WM. M. GWIN,

“*United States Senate, Washington.*”

Commodore Perry (good authority) thus addresses the Secretary of the Navy, under date of February 18, 1852, relative to the Collins line:

“According to my calculations, the cost of the conversion of either the before-mentioned vessels, exclusive of armaments, repair of machinery, &c., would not, or certainly ought not to cost for each steamer over \$20,000; and it could readily be done for this at any of our navy yards. With respect to the description and weight of their respective armaments, I am clearly of the opinion that the first class steamers already named could easily carry four 10-inch Paixhan guns on pivots—two forward and two aft—of the weight of those in the Mississippi, and ten 8 inch Paixhan guns on the sides; and this armament would not incommode the vessels, and the weight less than the ice, which is usually forty tons, and stowed away in one mass.”

Commodore Perry continues, that—

“In the general operations of a maritime war, they could render good service, and especially would they be useful from their great speed as despatch vessels, and for the transportation of troops, always capable of attack and defence, and of overhauling or escaping from an enemy.

“The Atlantic, Pacific, Baltic, and Arctic have all been built, inspected, and received by the Navy Department.”

The fact that the calculations of the owners of the Collins line were incorrect is cited here against their requests for additional aid, as if mistakes of this kind were not incident to such a concern far more likely to occur against themselves than against the Government, because of the earnestness of the company to connect themselves with the Government. But mistakes of this kind are not unusual. In 1836 Great Britain received proposals to carry these trans-atlantic mails. But in the attempt to fulfil the contract Cunard's company broke down. It is the first step which costs, Mr. Chairman. In 1839 Cunard took the contract for £85,000 per annum. The next year it was found necessary to increase the payment to £110,000 per annum. And with the compensation of \$550,000 a year Cunard failed and went into bankruptcy. The Government of Great Britain then increased the compensation to £145,000 per annum; which sum was continued until 5th April, 1852, when, in consequence of the increase in the size of the steamers—I call the attention of the committee to that fact—the Government gave about £171,000, or more than \$855,000 per annum.

The size of the ships was deemed of consequence to the British Government, and it is worth taking into consideration here.

Cunard's line has seven steamers, with an aggregate tonnage of 12,282, making eighty-five trips a year, or the working of 145,750 tons, for which the exact payment is \$856,871, or \$5 75 per ton.

Collins's line has four steamers, with an aggregate tonnage of 13,702, and under present contract crossing the Atlantic fifty-two times a year, and thus takes across the Atlantic 30,000 tons more than Cunard, with his seven ships; for which service Collins will receive, if the amendment before us should pass, the sum of \$858,000, or \$4 82 a ton, being less, by twenty per cent., than the amount paid by Great Britain to Cunard.\*

\*The line of ocean mail steamers, usually called the Collins line, has been in operation since the month of April, 1850, or about two years; the ships had made, previously to January last, forty-two trips from New York to Liverpool, and forty from Liverpool to New York. The contract for the transportation of the United States mail between the places above named was made on the 1st day of November, 1847, the law which authorizes it having been passed on the 3d of March preceding:

The line consists of the following vessels, viz:

The Atlantic.....	2,845	66-95ths tons burden....	commenced April,	1850
The Pacific.....	2,707	10-95ths.....do.....do.....	May,	1850
The Arctic.....	2,856	75 95ths.....do.....do.....	October,	1850
The Baltic.....	2,723	9-95ths.....do.....do.....	November,	1850

These ships cost, when ready for sea, in cash, \$2,944,142 76, or an average of \$736,035 67 each.

They have made forty-one voyages between New York and Liverpool, at an average expense of \$65,212 64 per voyage, making, in all, the sum of \$2,673,841 24, which, when added to the cost of the ships, say \$2,944,142 76, makes the entire amount of money expended \$5,617,984.

On the other hand, the average receipts of the company, per voyage, have been, as stated, \$48,286 85, or in all, \$1,979,760 85—amount advanced, \$208,000—and amount paid for two years mail service, \$770,000, making the total receipts from all sources, \$2,957,760 85.

If the amount of receipts, as above, be deducted from the amount of expenditures, say \$5,617,984, the balance against the concern will be \$2,660,223 15, and if the original capital subscribed be deducted, to wit: \$1,132,000, there will remain an outstanding deficiency of \$1,528,223 15, to be met by the present value of their ships.

In the meanwhile the company has paid to the government two annual instalments upon the \$385,000 advanced, which, at ten per cent. annually, upon the sum loaned, amount to \$77,000, reducing the balance on its debt to the government to \$308,000, which is in the course of being paid at the rate above named, and will have been cancelled entirely in eight years from this time, the ships being held as security until the whole debt shall have been paid.

The whole amount earned by this line, in letter postage, up to the 1st of March last, has been \$373,337 80, which sum is taken as the fair basis of calculation, as the three twenty-fourths due to the British government has been met, by as large

By his first contract, Collins was to make forty voyages. And on the 15th of last November the whole number of voyages was completed, and nothing remained to be done until the 1st of May, 1852. The Postmaster General then wrote to Mr. Collins directing him to make six more round trips, for which he should re-

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or a larger sum due from that government for the five twenty-fourths payable to the Government of the United States upon the earnings of the Cunard line, under the postal treaty between the two countries. Taking, then, the gross amount of receipts from letter postage, say \$373,337 80, and adding to it \$3,200, for postage for the State Department, \$90,151 58 for closed mails for the continent, carried by this line, and \$46,858 88 postage for newspapers, the aggregate earnings for the government by this line, will have been \$513,546 80.

The government has paid to the line for mail service, in the two years \$770,000 and has received from the line \$513,546 80. If the receipts be deducted from the outlay, the balance against the government is \$256,453 20, for the whole time, or \$128,226 60 per annum.

Thus it appears, that from a fair statement of the account current between the line and the government, the latter is out of pocket at the end of the two first years of the undertaking and under circumstances the most disadvantageous to the line, \$256,453 20, or in other words, has paid \$128,226 60 per annum, for carrying the ocean mail by steam over about six thousand miles of the greatest commercial thoroughfare in the world, for which, as yet, it has received nothing in return. But your committee would ask, what has *the country* received in return for this \$256,453 20? They will furnish the answer. The country has received through the proprietors of this line, in the form of freights and passage money, a no less amount than \$1,979,760 85, in cash; and, if the reduction in the prices of freight formerly paid to the British line be taken into account, nearly as much more, by saving the difference in freights and passage money, to say nothing of the general advantages derived by all of our producing interests from the existence of this American line, which, as your committee believe, are incalculable. The money account will then stand as follows: government debtor to \$256,453 80; country creditor to \$1,979,760 85, *in cash*; and if the former be deducted from the latter the balance in favor of the country will stand \$1,723,307 05, *in cash alone*, leaving out of view the duties on increased importations caused by the establishment of the American line.

It will be borne in mind that this result has been produced under the most disadvantageous circumstances possible. When the Collins line, consisting of but *four* steamers, was commenced, the Cunard line, consisting of *six* of the finest steamers in the world, and backed by the government and whole commercial influence of Great Britain, had been in existence for several years and enjoyed a monopoly of the steam postage and freight, between the United States and Europe. To succeed in competing with such a rival, it was necessary to present something in the way of ocean steam navigation, which should surpass anything that had previously ex-

ceive a *pro rata* compensation; and the Secretary of the Navy concurred in the plan; and thus the Collins line on the 1st of May had completed the trips.

“But why,” it is asked by the honorable gentleman, “why not accept the proposition of the new company to run between St. John’s and Galway?”

When that company shall have been established and proved itself competent to the fulfilment of its high promises, then will be the time to relinquish another

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isted, and secure the patronage of the commercial and travelling public, by its decided superiority on the score of speed, safety, and accommodation. This has been done by the Collins line in the most unequivocal manner. The superior swiftness of its ships has been amply ascertained; their safety has been tested in the severest manner, and the results have shown that stronger ships cannot be built, while on the score of elegance and comfort of accommodation, even the British public press, one-sided as it is known usually to be, in matters connected with national superiority, has frankly admitted, that, whatever might be said as to strength and power, in point of elegance and convenience, the American ships are at least ten years in advance of the British. Unfortunately for the projectors and performers of this great *national* undertaking, experience has shown that, with a communication only twice a month, and *four ships to contend with six, backed as they were by the British Government and commercial patronage*, which gave a direction in their favor to all the freights, postages, and other incidents of a commerce by far the greater portion of which is essentially *British*, this company has, as yet, received no adequate reward for its efforts. In this, however, no blame can possibly attach to the proprietors of the line, who have been the *only* sufferers, and who are, in the opinion of your committee, entitled to the lasting gratitude of their country. If their expenses have been enormous, it has not been for their own personal benefit; for, while they are losers to a vast amount, the country has been the gainer in every way. The government is virtually in possession of four of the finest and fleetest ocean steamers afloat, capable of being converted, in the course of a few days, into war-steamers of the first class, carrying heavy batteries, and that, too, at a trifling expense. These steamers are being kept in commission, to all useful intents and purposes, for the insignificant sum of \$128,226 60 a year, the cost of transporting the mail being the only outlay; when, if they formed a part of the *navy proper*, their expenses would have been, as estimated, no less than \$2,000,000 a year, if in active service, and over \$500,000 a year, if in the navy yards ready for service. Nor is this all. These very same ships, which have for the first two years of their mail-service cost the government only \$128,226 60 a year, will in all probability very soon not only pay their way, but return a large surplus revenue in the form of postages, the increase of income from this source, in 1851, over that of the preceding year, 1850, having been, as your committee are informed by the Postmaster General, \$183,734 05.

to go to that. Who shall say that the Galway enterprise will not prove more disastrous than the Collins line threatens to be? And then, after yielding up one glorious scheme, one real, national means of contest, we shall have either to apply additional funds, or to yield again to British superiority. Nay, Mr. Chairman, are you satisfied, is the honorable gentleman who propounded the question, "Why not accept the Galway proposition?" is he satisfied that that is better than the route and line now used? I am not. The Commissioners of the British Admiralty are not. Those sharp-seeing officers discover at the mouth of the Galway harbor a number of low rocks, call "bull heads," that render it most dangerous to approach that place with a westerly wind. And with such dangerous objects to guard *that* coast, they recommend Cape Clear and the harbor of Cork as more easily accessible under all circumstances. I do not wish to see Brother Jonathan beat his brains out against those bull heads. I leave to the honorable gentleman who propounds the question the duty and labor of deciding how we are to manage between St. John's and Halifax, and between Halifax and the United States. There is nothing yet in the Galway proposition to divert this country from the existing route, which is practicable, and on which we can beat the British. "The cheaper offer of Galway," says the gentleman. Sir, we have had enough of cheap contracts.

And here, too, it may be proper to state, that the difficulty between the Government and the Collins Company, if, indeed, it may not be more appropriate to say, the difficulty of the Collins Company with the Government, comes from an attempt to fix a price for a service before the cost of performing it is fully comprehended; and hence, it may be deemed improper, as



it would certainly be imprudent, to accept new proposals by a new and, as yet, unestablished company, when we are made sensible of the inconveniences of the beginning of such labors. Let us also, while we are conveying the mail, bear in mind that we are sustaining the Navy. And though the former office, considering the advantage which Great Britain has over us in her liberality to the Cunarders—which, indeed, is only enlarged selfishness—is costly yet beyond the outlay, yet the latter is affected to a great extent at a saving of twice the balance against the postage account.

Mr. Chairman, I regret as much as any one the necessity which drives this company hither, and forces us upon our national pride; and I regret it so much, that I desire to have no repetition of the appeal. Let us do the work well now, and secure the triumph while we can, and while it will be a profit as well as a victory.

In referring to the amount appropriated to enable these Collins steamers to carry the mails, we must not forget to deduct therefrom the amount received for postage; and still further we must consider the fact, most important in its bearing upon the view which I would have you take of the question, viz: that the difference of appropriation and receipts is annually diminishing, and ere long, it is evident the investment we make will become one of profit to the nation; pecuniarily so, as well as in other ways.

The protection which you have given, and which we now ask Congress to increase, operates as almost all other protection which Congress has extended to home industry and home capital; it daily reduces the cost of the work, and thus enables the people of this country to be more and more independent of the Government and people of the Old World. And I have no hesitancy in saying, that while I expect that many honor-

able members of the House will vote for this amendment upon grounds different from those which I assume, and will satisfy themselves and others with a course of argument different from that which I adopt, yet I regard the spirit in which this amendment is presented, as of that true character which seeks to interpose the shield of governmental protection between the efforts and schemes of the people of this country, and the plans sustained by the institutions and governmental patronage of foreign countries; and I shall vote for this amendment with the same cheerfulness, if not upon the same grounds with which I shall, if I have an opportunity, vote to give the protection to home industry, in addition to that now enjoyed by the tariff of 1846.

Sir, I go for my country in all that goes for her honor, her comfort, her prosperity, her independence; and whether a ten cent pocket handkerchief, or a half a million of dollars steamer be the point, upon which the question of Great Britain or the United States may turn, I go for the United States against the World.

I desire, Mr. Chairman, to divest this proposition of every appearance of monopoly which has been charged upon it, and to protect it in the enlarged view of a national enterprise to which it is entitled. The amount asked for, if given, is not to sustain the Collins company against any other company, nor one American interest against another. I have shown that. I appeal, and shall appeal, to national pride, which is certainly concerned in the maintenance of the Collins line against the Cunard line. I appeal to general cupidity, which may have a gratification in the varied rate of freight consequent on the establishment of the Collins line, making an aggregate saving of five times the extra amount of support solicited. I appeal to the principle of national economy—and it must be pleased at a pros-

pect which supplies the country with war steamers of the kind, most to be needed, and when needed, at a cost which involves only the building, and not the maintenance of the ships. I appeal directly, plainly, openly, to that American feeling which manifests its gratification at every result which exhibits American superiority, from the reaping machine at the Chrystal Palace, to the ocean palaces of Collins's line.

Notwithstanding the kind of objection to the plan which this amendment is intended to support, I imagine that there are in this House of Representatives of the American people, not many who really think that it is no consequence whether Great Britain or the United States convey the mails across the Atlantic. Sometimes these abstract views have a specious bearing, and obtain a momentary triumph. But the American citizen who can deliberately sit down in the conviction that if the mails are conveyed as rapidly, it is of no consequence to him who conveys them—is ripe for the conclusion, that if he is personally safe under the Government, it is of no consequence whether our own people or the Governments of Europe supply its rulers.

The distance between supplying our steam conveyances and furnishing our rulers, is undoubtedly very great; but in a philosophic view, Mr. Chairman, not greater than that between the seed time and the harvest. Let any nation commence furnishing another with the conveniences, and she soon acquires a monopoly of the necessaries of life; and he must be blind that does not see the intimate relations which exist between the failure of our people to meet the first great step of England to monopolize our ocean commerce, and their yielding *all* to the superior backing which individual British efforts receive from the British Government.

Step by step that great, that artful and specious

Government is gaining upon our country. Port after port is opened to her trade. Manufacture after manufacture is yielding to her demands; and while this is going on, and she has New York and Boston as the depots of her shipping that carries the American mail, she is demanding reciprocal trade with Canada, and is thrusting her fingers wherever else an opening seems to suggest the success of additional efforts. I desire, Mr. Chairman, when she thrusts her fingers thus into the American trade, to teach her the fate and punishment of Milo; and not the smallest effort which Great Britain has made is this of the steamers.

Hitherto the Americans have beaten the British in the beauty of their ships, in the elegance of accommodation, and, most of all, most galling to the British, most gratifying to American pride, they have been the conquerers in point of time in that great measure of *locomotive* success.

Now, I know it is said that this whole contest is "a boat race across the Atlantic," (it was so said with a sneer by an honorable Senator,) and therefore unworthy the consideration of our national councils.

It is something more than a "boat race," sir—much more; but even if it were not, if it was only to settle the question of superiority in that single particular, it would still be worthy our special consideration, and our liberal support. Nothing that is national is unworthy of us. But supposing it is only a "boat race?" That race, sir, may become of vast national consequence. You recollect the interest, sir, which was manifested in England, some months since, in the race between the American yacht and the British vessel of the same character. It was not the excitement of a foot race, or a horse race. It was not the amount of money at issue, but the extent of reputation involved; and when the

American triumphed, (and the Americans always will triumph when fair play is insured,) then, sir, the matter was deemed of consequence enough to occupy the attention of the British Parliament, a proof that it was of national interest, and connected with national honor.

Honorable gentlemen must not underrate the importance of the capability of a vessel to beat in "a race." It is the power to overtake a retreating foe, the ability to escape from a superior force. The vessel that can come from Liverpool to New York in one day less than any other ship, can, in the event of war, overhaul any ship to which it may give chase, or can escape from any force with which it is deemed imprudent to contend. Let not that be overlooked.

In July, 1812, the frigate Constitution, under the command of Captain Isaac Hull, was descried by a British fleet, on the eastern coast of Massachusetts. That ship, sir, which stood the brunt of the whole of the war afterwards, seemed then destined to be the first maritime martyr of that war, to consummate on the ocean the evils and disgrace which had been begun and continued on the frontier. Ships-of-the-line, frigates, sloops, and tenders were rather a formidable sight for a single frigate; to fight would have been impossible—to strike would have been a terrible beginning of the war on the sea. There was but one course left, and that was to escape. The energy of the officers and crew of the ship, and her fleetness, saved her—saved the good old Constitution to gather from other fields the harvest of glory reaped in the battles with the Guerrier, the Java, the Cyane and the Levant. Sir, the "boat race," in which the United States ship Constitution won the cup, was of as much consequence, and as full of glory to the nation, as was the battle in which the British fleet were destroyed on the lakes.

Sir, there is a "boat race" going on now between the clippers of our Atlantic cities, and the merchant ships of Great Britain, and I need not tell this House, that the American clippers are everywhere distancing their competitors; and individual profit, and national credit are resulting therefrom.

Sir, the carrying trade between China and Great Britain is now much in the hands of the owners of the American clipper-built ships.

The "boat race," then, is of national consequence; and England, that has styled herself the mistress of the seas, stands aghast at the fact, that her pleasure yachts, in which speed is the great desideratum, are out-run by the pleasure boats of the United States, while her national ships are crowded from her own docks by American merchantmen, that come to bring to the British ports the goods of the British merchant.

Mr. Chairman, do you think that Great Britain does not see that the same ingenuity and enterprize which construct a yacht and a merchant ship to out-sail others, may be applied to ships of war, and that the sovereignty of the ocean may be derived from the speed of a sail-boat or steamers.

Mr. Chairman, let me urge upon this House the dangers of neglecting whatever may be the instrument of national contest. Superiority may be conceded for a time, in what it takes time to complete; but no nation will wisely and willingly admit that she is to remain inferior. No matter on what the stake is set for national contest, it is of national import that victory should be achieved.

Is it in arts? Genius and science will lend their powers with patriotic devotion to insure superiority. Is it in arms? Courage, skill, and daring will seek to snatch the palm of victory. Is it in humanity and its

benevolent schemes? The heart, while it yields admiration to the efforts of others, will seek to procure the crown to itself. In commerce, in agriculture, in all that gives wealth, dignity, confidence, and superiority to a nation, let us encourage our own people to take the lead. And let us not despise the spirit which fixes a nation's interests, and exercises a nation's energies in the combat for swiftness in steamships. Sir, if Great Britain presents *that* as the test of superiority, as the cause of national combat, let us accept the gage and do the battle, assured—

“That when the fight becomes a chase,  
He wins the fight who wins the race.”

I ask, Mr. Chairman, for the means of victory to American exertions here. Since the British merchant has confessed that he cannot compete with those of the United States, without the patronage of the British Government; and since the British Government have seen the policy of granting that patronage, you, Mr. Chairman, the honorable members of this House, will not, I am sure, see the American merchant succumb for want of a little patronage from the American Government.

Let England excel France in the number and size of her ships; let France excel Austria in the discipline of her armies, and Russia outrate Holland in the extent of her territory, and each European nation be superior in some respect to any and every other European power; but oh, *let*—nay, not *let*—let us *help* our own beloved Republic to excel them in all. Let them claim and deserve, each of them, some superiority among themselves; but let pre-eminence in all that is good and great be the prerogative of the United States.

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